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ANNOUNCEMENT

With this issue THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN completes its first volume. Mr. Reardon, the former editor, joins with the present incumbent in gratefully acknowledging the assistance rendered them by all who have helped to make this enterprise a success. Special thanks are due to those who assisted in the arduous labor of typeing and mimeographing the bulletin, particularly to Mr. Peter Brooks and Mr. Francis Walter; also to Father Schwitalla and Mr. Paul Carroll, to whose kind cooperation we are indebted for the printing of the first two numbers.

The next issue will appear in October. Our mailing list provides that at least one copy is sent to every college in the Province. Any oversight or omissions in this list will be corrected when brought to our attention. All suggested corrections, as well as requests for additional copies, should be communicated to the Editor before September 15.

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PHENOMENISM EXPOSED

Everyone who has been so fortunate as to inherit that wealth of common sense which is Scholasticism, I feel sure, some time or other has been moved at the floundering and gropings of those denied this torch of truth. And, if at any one time more than another the strayings of these latter have provoked feeling, perhaps it is when we find them attacking the traditional doctrine of substance. With Mercier we are forced to exclaim in sheer wonderment: "Is it credible that thinkers of the first order, like Hume, Mill, Spencer, Kant, Wundt, Paulsen, Littré, Taine, should have failed to recognize the substantial character of things, and of the EGO or SELF." And yet the teachings they have propounded are ample vouchers that they have failed in just this point.

Let us then, here at the outset, insist on the two essential notes that go to constitute the concept of substance, viz. real being, and independence of a subject of inhesion; and the characteristic note of an accident, which is the need of a subject in which and by which it may exist. A substance is thus defined as: "that to whose essence it belongs not to exist in another, as in a subject of inhesion"; and an accident as "that to whose essence it belongs to subsist in another, as in a subject of inhesion."

But the phenomenist would have it that this distinction between substance and accident is a groundless one; that we experience but passing events with mere relations of sequence between them; and that to suppose a permanent, abiding, sustaining something called substance underlying them is without meaning. Or, that something which we call substance is but a name. Experience acquaints us with a congeries of phenomena, or appearances, and we are pleased to term it substance. Thus substance is merely a fiction of the mind. It may be quite natural to suppose a something underlying these phenomena, which experience conveys, but to hold that this something really exists, that it has a mode of being in itself, this is simply unwarrantable. Again, granted that there does exist this something underlying phenomena, please just what is the nature of this something? Thus the phenomenist comes to question the importance of the objective validity of substance; for, even if there is such a thing, we must after all remain ignorant of its nature.

Now in the face of all this we maintain that the distinction between substance and accident is not groundless. And to hold that it is, is, as Mercier observes, to imply that: "the genius of Aristotle was duped by a naive illusion, and that all those sincere and earnest teachers who adopted and preserved in scholastic philosophy for centuries the distinction between substance and accidents have been utterly astray in interpreting an elementary fact of common sense." Moreover, we maintain that in external fact there not only really exists a something which corresponds to our concept of substance, but that the nature of this something can be sufficiently known. And finally this doctrine of the objective validity of substance is not bootless, but of supreme consequence, for if substance is at best but a mental fiction, then is metaphysics stripped of all genuine significance.

Now, for one who admits any reality whatever, there is little difficulty in substantiating the distinction between accidents and substance, and in coming to a knowledge of the real existence of the latter. Above, substance was defined as "that which exists in itself," and an accident as "that which exists in another as in a subject of inhesion." Now it is evident that anything that is, exists

according to one of these two modes of being. But if it exists in itself, our definition is at once fulfilled, and we have substance. If it does not exist in itself, it must exist in another. But this other must in turn exist in itself or in another. Thus the same question returns again and again to infinity, which is absurd. Hence, whoever admits any reality at all, is forced to recognize the distinction and to admit the existence of substance.

It is precisely here, however, that phenomenism takes its rise. It is nothing more than the outgrowth of Idealism and Positivism, the former limiting all knowledge of the human mind to the mind's own states, and the latter admitting no reality other than that conveyed immediately through external and internal experience. Thus, though neither Descartes nor Locke denied the existence of substance, yet Descartes, because of his idealistic theory of innate ideas, arrived at the false conclusion that we have an intuitive insight into the nature of substances, while Locke, denying and disproving this theory, but confining the knowledge of the mind to its own states, came to conclude that since we have no intuitive insight into the nature of substance, we have no knowledge of its real nature at all. He says: "The ideas then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist 'sine re substante', without something to support them, we call that support substantia."

But our knowledge of substance is more than an unknown support of accidents. And we arrive at this knowledge through experience and reason. Thus, for example, by the senses is perceived a horse that runs. By reflection two distinct realities are apprehended - 'horse' and 'running'; and the former as a being existing in itself, while the latter depends upon the former for its existence, or subsists in it as in a subject of inhesion. In short, here we have in objective reality two distinct modes of being, corresponding exactly with our concepts of accident, and substance, this concept of substance being not 'a supposed but unknown support of accidents', as Locke would have it, but a reality existing in itself.

Richard A. Welfle, S. J.

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PHILOSOPHY AND THE HIGH SCHOOL TEACHER

A firm grasp of the great truths of philosophy and the readiness to impart them are indispensable to the Jesuit teacher. The reason for this statement is the patent fact that we teach literature and history and language and the sciences from the text books of men whose minds have been formed in schools where real philosophy is an unknown visitor. This false background is bound to cast its shadow on the works produced by these men. If the teacher has not an eagle eye to detect the error lurking back of a fine piece of diction, the student absorbs the poison with the perfume and the rays of the truth for him have been dimmed.

That such men as Gibbon, Macaulay, Emerson, Wordsworth write well, no one will doubt; that these men teach error decked in pleasing garb, we should

know, and should be able to point out to our students wherein they have erred. Even such a sterling thinker and honest statesman as Edmund Burke is not immune from slips in this regard; and I may say, if Burke has nodded, we may well look for long periods of sleep from other sources. An example in point might be Burke's description of Marie Antoinette, one of the finest pieces of literature in the English language. Towards the end of this passage Burke says, "and vice itself lost half its evil by losing all its grossness." The obvious meaning here is that vice perpetrated in an artistic fashion is not as bad as vice done in a grosser way. The Jesuit teacher should be ready to step forth with the truth that vice is vice, sin is sin, whether done by king or peasant, scientist or laborer. A murder is a murder whether the guilty one uses an axe or a magnificently decorated stiletto to accomplish the deed.

The Chicago Tribune, "the world's greatest newspaper," at the top of its editorial column every day carries this saying of Stephen Decatur: "My country: in her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right, but my country, right or wrong." Well, thousands of people (students of Catholic colleges included) read this paper every day, and if their attention is never called to the underlying misconception in this statement, it will become a part of their mental equipment and of course they will be none the better for its acquisition. Needless to say, in dealing with questions where loyalty to country is concerned, prudence must dominate our actions; but here we are only speaking of principles.

Instances could be multiplied, but there is now need of that, as every one is aware that there are thousands of them. My point is that if the teacher of literature or history or science glides by these cases without even the cold respect of a passing glance, he is missing a great chance as a Jesuit to impart the truth and correct error. It will not do to say that we are not teaching philosophy to this class, because, no matter what our class may be, we are to teach the truth. Nor can we mitigate our neglect by saying, "Wait till they get their philosophy." For nine out of ten boys who start out with us in high school never take our philosophy course; and if their teachers neglect to give them these corrections along the way, virgin soil has been allowed to bring forth briars and brambles along with whatever real flowers we have caused to grow in their minds.

Finally, all of our students are destined to become citizens of our country as well as of heaven; we want them to be real citizens, and in order to be such they must have the proper viewpoint of our Catholic foundation principles,-- principles with which the Constitution of our country is so well in accord. And if they do not learn from us (in our daily teaching) to whom shall they go? Much can be said on this score relative to ways and means. But I think we can truly say we all ought to be ready, and indeed have a duty, to be alert in pointing out basic errors of philosophy that occur in the writings of the masters we teach from.

Daniel H. Conway, S.J.

PRAGMATISM

Should philosophy determine our actions or should our actions shape our philosophy? In other words, should the science of philosophy be anything more than merely a tabulation of phenomena obtained by observing human actions? This may seem a strange question to ask a scholastic philosopher. How could such a question be raised by sane men, and if raised, how can it receive any other response than an affirmative to the first alternative? No ~~kk~~ other answer seems possible to a man who recognizes the freedom of the will and is cognizant of the liberty of his actions. Men have, of course, in times past called in question the truth of free will, but it remained for this age to build up a system of philosophy based upon the subserviency of intellect and thought to action. This system is the philosophy of pragmatism, whose watchword is utility; and what more fitting home for such a philosophy than America, where efficiency and utility are the ultimate standards by which all things are measured?

Inaugurated by men like the late William James, John Dewey, F. C. S. Schiller, and Henri Bergson, pragmatism calls in question our ability ever to arrive at complete reality, and makes utility the criterion of truth. It justifies its presence among the many existing systems of philosophy, for though it does not aspire to the name of philosophy, it treats philosophical matters on the ground that other systems have proved themselves inadequate to solve practical problems, and that of all systems, it alone has the capacity of absorbing and harmonizing all other philosophies.

Though pragmatism asserts that truth is useful and that utility is the sole criterion of truth, by some species of argument not plain to ordinary minds it denies the converse statement that utility is truth. Pragmatists formulate their propositions on that "core of reality" which the human intellect is able to attain by the senses. These propositions stand or fall as they successfully withstand or do not withstand the test of utility. They may stand for a time until they fail to satisfy that same test of utility; or they may be stable, and consequently true from one point of view and false from another. For the pragmatist every truth is on the same basis as, for instance, the atomic theory. It explains for the present all the phenomena involved in our knowledge of matter; but since further investigation may reveal facts which will modify this theory, it is only a tentative hypothesis that seems to correspond to actual reality. Pragmatism holds that our closest approach to any reality is of like nature. We can never secure sufficient data to insure any truth against change. With our increasing knowledge, truth is one thing today and tomorrow is changed. The mind is ever trying to arrive at that vague evanescent something which we call reality, a thing which outside the mind we can touch but never grasp. The thing that we do attain and that we call reality is in part true reality, in part a mere construction of the mind. Pragmatists uphold the most sacred objects and traditions of human belief inasmuch as they are useful, and reject them inasmuch as they fail to satisfy our sense of usefulness. While designed to preserve religion and Christianity from the advance of materialism, it only adds to the confusion of things and opens up the road to the most radical scepticism.

Such are some of the difficult doctrines proposed in this modern practical philosophy. Judged by the old standards of philosophy, it fails as a system to redeem its right to the name of philosophy. Worst of all, it cannot vindicate its right of existence even by a test according to its own requirements. It does not work. It succumbs to the test of utility, a test which on the other hand scholasticism has stood for nearly two thousand years, and bids fair to stand till the end of time. Pragmatism is in very truth a corridor philosophy or method---note, too, method without philosophy---which does away with all philosophy. Yet it stands today, perhaps the most influential of all systems, and seems destined to a long life. It has behind it some of the leading psychologists and scientists of the hour. It is made to fit perfectly with the most extravagant of the psychological accounts of the process of thought, and it harmonizes with the theories of the most radical evolutionists. When we condemn systems of philosophy taught at many of our leading universities, we are contending with systems built up on pragmatic logic.

Bertram E. Ernst, S. J.

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WHY "HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY"?

History of philosophy is usually taught from a book which bears this title. It is as great a mistake to try to teach something about philosophers in this way as it is to teach literature in the way of histories of literature. These books resolve themselves into a series of "tendencies" and "movements", chasing one another carelessly down the centuries. The real history of philosophy was not made in that fashion. What happened was something like this. A great philosopher like Plato or Aristotle arose. Then everybody kept repeating and ringing the changes on the words and ideas of these men for some centuries. During this time nothing original was produced; men were contented with whittling down or diluting the truths of these philosophers. Why then call such men philosophers? Why should Cicero get into a history of philosophy? Why should Seneca? Why should the neo-Academicians? Their ideas are not origins but more echoes.

A book like the conventional "History of Philosophy" therefore has too wide a sweep,, includes too many men. Another defect is that it does not give a just idea of what the men in the book really stood for or what they were like. I am sure that a student of philosophy would get infinitely more of the spirit of Plato and his philosophy if he were to read three or four of the dialogues of Plato than if he were to read twenty pages of names and dates about Plato and his "tendencies" and his school, and a summary of his teachings. One could get a better idea of Aristotle by reading any book of his in the fine "Oxford Translation" than by conning a bald summary of dates and doctrine.

Histories of philosophies must needs devote much space to the problem of the reconciliation of dogma and reason, or faith and reason. What better way of stating this problem, of settling it and impressing it on the mind, than to have the student read the "Paidagogos" of Clement of Alexandria, which is available in the Loeb library. To give the Catholic student a taste of the genius who fused all the elements of the early Church into a summa of his own, hand him the "Confessions of St. Augustine." For one unacquainted with Latin we suggest the translation of the Benedictine from Downside Abbey, who has just published an admirable edition notable for its scholarly qualities and for its craftsmanship in

bookmaking. Even as a crown on the course of humane letters the "Confessions" are necessary, seeing that no book in the holy Latin tongue, with the possible exception of the Aeneid, has run through so many editions.

Why burden and dissipate the student's mind with all the names and dates and non-entities that a history of philosophy can crowd into the period between St. Augustine and St. Thomas? Why not admit that there were many patient and conservative workers during that time, and then go on to read something of St. Thomas? Since his metaphysics and his philosophy forms the backbone of the course, there is no need to say much about these works. Rather make the students read something that St. Thomas did not go in for so deeply,-- politics. His two political works "De Regimine Principum" and "De Regimine Judaeorum" are short, and would give a good idea of St. Thomas.

Armed with this first-hand knowledge, the student could never be told later on that St. Augustine and St. Thomas were nobodies in philosophy. The actual contact with the words of these masters would forever dispel the illusion that Augustine and Aquinas could not think, or that they thought only on theological subjects. But it might not be hard to convince a student that these men were nobodies if his recollections of them were scraps and names and dates. In the same way you might convince a man who had read several hundred pages about Newman and his satellites and his "tendencies", that Newman was not a great philosopher. But you could not put that idea into the head of a man who had read the "Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine". Instead of "History of Philosophy", try the actual masterpieces of only a few great philosophers. If you treat of all the men who philosophized you are piling up chaff. It will not stay in the memory of the student, and if it did it would merely clutter up the ways of the mind. But if you make them read from beginning to end some dialogues of Plato, some treatises of Aristotle, the "Confessions of St. Augustine", and a shorter work of St. Thomas, you have given them a "ktema eis aei" in literature and philosophy. "History of Philosophy" is merely a bad habit we formed in aping modern schools of materialistic philosophy.

Alfred G. Brickel, S. J.

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ABOUT THE CORRIDORS

Our main news item this month,-- one which excludes a number of other interesting items,-- is that the examinations begin June 3.

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For an account of the spring disputations in philosophy, our readers are referred to the Province News Letter.

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Four of our third year~~x~~ philosophers have been requested by Father Horine, Dean of the Arts Department, to assist in examining the Junior Class in philosophy. These four men, Messrs. O'Leary~~x~~, Steiner, Perry and Brooks, will be members of the examination board in Epistemology.

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A recent number of the Varsity Breeze makes mention of the series of lectures on aphasia delivered by Father Gruender before the students of the Medical School. The lecturer spoke of visual, auditory, and motor aphasia, pointing out that the phenomena attendant upon these conditions furnish no argument against the existence of intellectual memory or of intellectual cognition.

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Father Mc Williams' paper on "The Discontinuity of Matter", read at the Thomistic Congress in Rome last month, contains an interesting and thorough discussion of the latest developments of the atomic theory and the philosophical problems connected therewith. His conclusion is that recent scientific data, while presenting no insurmountable difficulties to our philosophical tenets, fails to afford a definite solution for our problems.

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EDITORIAL

THE BRITISH SCIENTISTS AND PHILOSOPHY

The growing interest in philosophy displayed by scientists is strikingly exemplified by the following quotation. In the April ~~xxxx~~ 18 issue of Nature, Macmillan's well-known scientific weekly, this paragraph heads the "Current Topics" column:

"The British Institute of Philosophical Studies has been formed by a number of professed philosophers together with some leading men of science, public men, and men of affairs. It is the belief of the promoters that philosophy has a larger part to play in the national life than has yet been recognised, both as an education and discipline to the individual, and as a basis of that more synthetic view of knowledge which they take to be the required corrective of the specialism enforced upon students by the rapid growth of science. They think that, in the position which the physical sciences have now reached, the need of a philosophic account of principles and methods is more apparent than it may have formerly been; that there is accordingly more disposition on the part of scientific men to discussions which might, not long ago, have been dismissed as metaphysical; while the philosophers on their side have much to learn of the picture of reality as presented by modern physics."

The trend of science, then, is "back to philosophy". But to what philosophy? Of scholasticism they know little or nothing. Yet we know that scholasticism is the only system which can give them that true "philosophic account of

principles and methods" which they need.

If we can succeed in bringing to the notice of scientists that our system is the very thing for which they are seeking, we will go far toward closing the age-old breach between philosophy and science.

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MORE ABOUT THE CONVENTION

The program for the general meeting of the Scientific Division of the Jesuit Educational Association is of exceptional interest to philosophers as well as scientists. It is to be a symposium on evolution, in which that ever-fresh topic will be discussed from four main aspects: exegetical, anthropological, biological and philosophical. The exegetical phase of the question will be treated by Father Aloysius Kemper; the anthropological, by Father Frumveller; the biological, by Father Schwitalla; and the philosophical, by Father Stritch. Such a thorough and scholarly presentation of the subject, by men so well qualified to speak with authority on the particular phase they have selected to discuss, cannot fail to arouse widespread interest.

To this general meeting an entire day will be devoted, thus affording ample opportunity for all to take part in the discussion on evolution.

The Philosophical Section

It has been definitely decided that the proposed Philosophical Section will be affiliated with the Scientists, and will meet on August 21, 22, and 23. Father Deglman is very much encouraged by the enthusiastic response given to his proposal of organizing this section, and he is sending a second letter to those interested. In this second letter he mentions the main problems to be dealt with at the first meeting, and asks for definite suggestions with regard to each.

Merely as a matter of convenience, these letters are being multiplied and mailed at St. Louis. All answers and other communications regarding this section should be sent direct to Father Deglman at Kansas City. As this is the last issue of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN for the present scholastic year, further details will be communicated by letter if necessary.

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NEXT YEAR---WHAT?

Beginning with our first issue next fall, we intend to follow a more systematic editorial policy than has been possible up to the present. A little bulletin like this can scarcely hope to cover the vast field of scholastic philosophy; although,--be it noted parenthetically,--there is not a single periodical in the field at present except the French "Revue Neo-Scholastique". Still we believe that, in the interests of efficiency and organization, definite series of articles should be planned for next year, and contributions be sought from everyone in the Province who is interested in philosophy. With this end in view, we have prepared a general outline of our plans for the coming year.. This, together with a sort of questionnaire, will be mailed to all our readers before the end of May. Aided by their suggestions, we hope to have a satisfactory plan of campaign in readiness by the middle of August.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Education of Behavior. By I. B. Saxby, D. Sc. Putnam, New York, 1925.

Studies in character building and the guidance of conduct interest every teacher. Thus Doctor Saxby's work has an appeal for all of us. His aim, as the publisher's notice tells us, is "to bring our present knowledge of psychology to bear on the problems of behavior which have to be faced by those in charge of boys and girls." The problems to be met arise, he tells us, in the preparation of the individual for adult life, viewed in general as "efficient citizenship." Preparation for self-preservation, for parenthood, for citizenship in the narrower sense, for the various refinements of life: these are the specific aims. It is to be regretted that he does not go further and propose the ideal of the Christian gentleman, the only adequate aim for education worthy of the name.

But perhaps it is not quite fair to blame him for not doing something better, when he has succeeded in doing a good work well. Besides, most of what he says can be applied with few modifications to the guidance of conduct towards an ideal religious as well as social. For apart from the introductory pages, the emphasis is on the psychological rather than the ethical aspect of character,-- the how more than the what and the why. Here he is thorough but simple. We might not agree with all his definitions, but it is worthy of note that he does define his terms.

The power of impulse and sentiment, the influence of example and suggestion, are well analyzed and the manner of directing them to desirable ends clearly indicated. We would like to see more emphasis on the use of objective principles and convictions, at least with older children, and less on the self-sentiment and emotional appeals. These latter are but the servants of man's higher powers, useful to sustain principle but dangerous if they become autonomous guides of conduct. In recommending the book to others, a word of caution is needed against accepting too literally what is said in favor of psychoanalysis and sex instruction.

The bibliography, which represents a wide range of authors from Herbert Spencer and Freud to Boyd Barrett, fails to include Hull's "Formation of Character." The author may have thought it too outspoken in its advocacy of a definite religious ideal to appeal to the general reader. Or perhaps he does not know the book.

Charles I. Doyle, S. J.

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Beginners' Logic. By R. H. Dotterer. Macmillan, New York, 1924.

If, as has been pointed out, formal logic and the mental training to be derived from it depend entirely on the skill acquired in readily discerning the comprehension and extension of terms, this work may justly lay claim to merit. Professor Dotterer, alive to the value of the "presentation by example" method, has aimed throughout to elucidate new concepts by an ample and carefully chosen selection of clear, pointed examples, rather than by abstract discussion. To this same end, he has introduced into each chapter exercises embodying the foregoing matter. These latter serve the twofold end of enabling the student to test his grasp on the principles presented, and of putting his knowledge to immediate practice.

Another winning feature is Professor Dotterer's judicious selection and arrangement of material. The book is designed for the mere beginner. Hence the very abstruse and recondite, which would at best only tend to obscure and confuse, have been omitted. In this respect the work may be regarded as a beginner's "minimum essentials".

It is, then, with sad disappointment that, after such an able exposition of the subject-matter of logic, one meets in the last chapter with remarks that would seem to indicate leanings toward subjectivism. This is especially true in the treatment under the heading "The Partial Truth of Authoritarianism". It is to be regretted that the author has allowed some portions of this last chapter to mar an otherwise very commendable work.

Richard A. Welfle, S. J.

(Editor's Note: The following comments of another reviewer may be of interest to those who desire a more explicit statement of the criticism contained in the last paragraph of the above.)

The author's exposition of authoritarianism is muddled both as to fact as well as to method; so muddled, indeed, that it is a fair example of the adage, "Error is manifold". It is difficult to lay one's finger on the source of his mistakes. It may be well, however, to point out the main passages where he attempts to state our position as Catholics; indicating briefly, at the same time, what we really hold in this matter.

"Roman Catholics, on the other hand, after centuries of discussion, came to the conclusion in 1870 that the teaching authority of the Church is concentrated in the Pope of Rome, who is the responsible interpreter both of Scripture and tradition. And when the Pope speaks ex cathedra, that is to say, 'from the chair', or officially, he is said to be divinely safeguarded against error."

Roman Catholics did not "come to this conclusion in 1870". This conclusion (which, by the way, is not the conclusion as the author states it) was explicitly stated in 1870. Implicitly it was held by Catholics ever since Christ made Peter the Primate of Christendom. The Pope is not "divinely safeguarded against error" simply and solely because, and when, speaking ex cathedra. He is divinely safeguarded against error when, "fulfilling the office of Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, he, with the plenitude of his Apostolic authority, defines a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the universal Church". (Vatican Council, Session IV, cap. 4, ad finem.)

"As long as the believer in ~~authority~~ infallibility....is content to postulate the trustworthiness of his favorite source of doctrine, he is invincible.....We may be pardoned for declining to take the infallible word of any infallible authority as sufficient evidence for its own infallibility....If, however, the infallibilist appeals to reason, he gets into a curious position. For he thereby admits the authority of the logical test of truth."

As a matter of fact, the trustworthiness of the Pope, as set forth by the definition of Infallibility, is not a postulate. Nor is the Pope's infallibility taken on his own word. Papal infallibility is proved, logically, soundly. The syllogism runs thus: Christ granted to Peter and his successors the prerogative of infallibility; but the Pope is the successor of Peter; therefore, Christ granted to the Pope the prerogative of infallibility. The argument depends, of

course, on the conditions: 1) that Christ actually did give to Peter and his successors such a prerogative; 2) that Christ could guarantee His grant. The proof of these conditions runs into history and the proof ~~that~~ of Christ's claim to be divinely authorized. But in no part of the argument ~~of~~ ~~him~~ is infallibility postulated.

And so, "the infallibilist who appeals to reason" does not "get into a curious position". He appeals to the authority of the logical test of truth because he has never denied it. He holds the Pope to be infallible, not because the Pope says so, but because Christ says so. And if it is denied that Christ says so, or that He had the authorization to say so, well and good. Here is a logical method of opposing the doctrine. Here a man can be met. Here horns can be locked. But to oppose the Pope's infallibility on the supposition that his own word cannot be taken when there is question of his own authority is more than bad logic. It displays a complete ignorance of the real belief of Catholics.

J. G. Smith, S. J.

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Textbook of Logic. By H. E. Cunningham.

Macmillan, New York, 1924.

This book by a professor of philosophy in West Virginia University will be useful to the advanced student who desires to carry on investigation in comparative philosophy. It is a capital exemplification of the confusion and inconsistency of thought that inevitably follow upon rejection of the fundamental principles of knowledge. The author makes the fundamental but all too popular mistake of gratuitously assuming that every proposition which is not proved is gratuitous. In other words, he takes for granted that immediate objective evidence is not a sufficient guarantee for the truth of any proposition. He looks upon axioms in whatever science as "donations from an intuitive mind", which the mind authoritatively imposes upon us and which we may submissively accept and put to good use in the construction of systems, but which we may with equal reasonableness reject, to construct totally opposed systems upon their denial.

It is evident that under this supposition all systems of thought and science are equally true, so long as they are internally equally consistent. They need not be consistent with each other, and two mutually contradictory systems may be true together. Hence, it may be true that two and two make four, if such a proposition fits into a system of mathematics, and it may at the same time be equally true that two and two make five, if a system can be constructed into which that proposition will fit. Neither can we assert absolutely that there is inconsistency in any given system, for that would be to yield ~~ourselves~~ to evidence, thereby submitting ourselves to the imposed authority of our intuitive mind. A circle may be a straight line, all time may be simultaneous, walking may be the speediest mode of locomotion, and pure sulphuric acid may be a delicious and highly salubrious beverage. There is only one thing that cannot possibly be true, and that is that truth is objective and independent of our mind's vagaries, and that our mind, when not abused, has the power to perceive self-evident objective truth with certainty. To admit that would be to submit to authority, for so-called objective evidence is only an illusion imposed upon us by unreasoned intuition.

Not only does all the above follow ineluctably from the principle upon which Professor Cunningham insists so strongly and so often throughout his book,

but much of the logic thus outlined is clearly and seriously propounded by him. Thus the mind's very aptitude for the acquisition of truth is implicitly and unmistakably if not formally denied; and since even the principle that proof of any kind is possible cannot be consistently accepted as absolutely true,--because it can obviously not be proved,--therefore all proof and all philosophy becomes meaningless and nugatory.

It is pitiful to see that men who occupy the position of leaders of thought, who have such an abhorrence of all unproved principles and manifest a besetting mortal fear of even the ghost of authority, allow their minds to be so imposed upon by the empty but tyrannical authority of popular fallacies, and in blind obedience to this authority, swallow and laboriously try to digest unproved principles which are destructive of all science.

The science that remains is a castle built upon clouds. The methods proposed are sometimes excellent as far as they go, or at least excellent in part; but every rule and statement proposed is a virtual or formal denial of the destructive principle first assumed. However shapely the building, every beam and stone of it supposes a foundation which has been preliminarily torn away from below. No wonder therefore that the building totters and is out of proportion. No wonder that even the methods of such a science abound in inconsistencies. The author's treatment of the syllogism is shallow, and intreating of scientific induction he fails utterly to show the real logical strength of that method of reasoning also. His chapter on historical method is probably the least unsatisfactory in the book. It draws largely from Langlois and Seignobos, and is a comprehensive and clear, though brief, outline of the science with which it deals.

Pierre Bouscaren, S. J.

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I Believe in God and in Evolution. By William W. Keen, M. D. Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1925.

After reading the various "blurbs" on the paper wrapper of this book I thought it was a book on evolution comparable to "Les Origines des Especies" by Dorlodot of Louvain University. But after reading the book I changed my mind. Doctor Keen lacks, not information, but that training in logical method so characteristic of Dorlodot. In fact, the Doctor never even approaches anything like a proof of his basic tenet that man's creation "was a gradual, instead of an instantaneous process, starting from a far lower form of animal life, slowly increasing in intelligence, and in his physical, moral, and spiritual nature, until he reached his present state".

Doctor Keen, does prove, however, something that philosophers have never tired of proclaiming: that man is an animal. The great difficulty for evolutionists is to prove that man gradually developed from a being without intelligence into a being with intelligence. In truth, the closer man is proved to the animal in his anatomical structure, the more wonderful does the gift of intelligence shine forth, and the louder does it clamor for a sufficient reason. Doctor Keen gives no reason. He simply assumes the principal thing which he ought to prove.

Similarity of structure merely proves that man is an animal. It does not at all prove that man is descended from the brute; but even supposing it did,

this conclusion could only refer to man's body. Thus the fact of intelligence would still have to be explained; and until its origin and development is clearly pointed out in man's supposed brute pedigree, the statement "I believe in evolution" (taking "evolution" in the sense of man's physical and intellectual development from lower forms of animal life) is a blind unreasoning act of faith. There are very solid rational grounds for saying, "I believe in God". But there is no sufficient basis, rational or scientific, for saying, "I believe in evolution."

Alfred G. Brickel, S. J.

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Everlasting Life. By William W. Keen, M. D. Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1925.

This book of 84 pages large type, a companion volume to the book reviewed above, is an expression by the author of his creed of Christianity. He insists on the fact that one may be abreast of the times scientifically and yet remain a good Christian. After attempting to pour oil on the troubled waters of the Protestant controversy about the Virgin Birth of Christ by declaring that there is nothing in Scripture which makes this a necessary article of faith, he sets down, as the Magna Charta of Christianity, belief in the Divinity and humanity of Christ and in the Atonement. The last part of his book is given over to a discussion of immortality, which he says can be clearly proved from the Bible, and to a speculation on our future life in Heaven.

Dr. Keen says many beautiful things about our Savior, and his thoughts on Heaven are, in the main, consoling. The book is written from the strictly Protestant standpoint of private judgment. To attempt a detailed refutation of this basic theory of Protestantism is hardly possible here; but Doctor Keen's analysis of the texts on the Virgin Birth is a typical example of the difficulties to which this theory gives rise. He tells us, on the one hand, that many passages in Scripture imply the actual paternity of Joseph; and that Christ Himself, in permitting Himself to be called the Son of David, implicitly admitted that Joseph, a lineal descendant of David, was His actual father. On the other hand Doctor Keen observes that St. Matthew positively asserts the Virgin Birth and St. Luke infers it. Here is a manifest contradiction in the revealed Word of God,-- a thing which Doctor Keen himself would be the last to admit. Yet, far from attempting to explain this difficulty, he does not seem even to notice it.

As a matter of fact, there is nothing in the Bible which implies that Joseph was Christ's actual father. Of course Christ was the Son of David; not because He was really the Son of Joseph, but because He was the Son of Mary, who, being near akin to Joseph, was herself a lineal descendant of David. The Evangelists give us the pedigree of Joseph rather than that of Mary, in conformity with the custom of the Hebrews, who in their genealogies took no notice of women.

The author has a fine description of the wonderful development of the human body in its prenatal stage, and clearly shows his solid grasp of the facts in his specialty, medicine.

Daniel H. Conway, S. J.

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Introduction to Modern Philosophy. By C. E. M. Joad.

A History of Ethics. By Stephen Ward. Oxford University Press, London, 1924.

These two little volumes are attractively printed and bound, are illustrated with fine full-page portraits of philosophers, and are written in that excellent English for which the writers of England are noteworthy. The books belong to "The World's Manuals" series. "Introduction to Modern Philosophy" contains five chapters, dealing respectively with "Modern Realism", "The Philosophy of Mr. Bertrand Russell", "Neo-Idealism", "Pragmatism", and "The Philosophy of Bergson". The author explains his selection by saying that he has "endeavoured to follow the principle of only introducing those doctrines which pass the double test of being both important and distinctively modern". The character of the book can perhaps be best illustrated by quoting the following delightful paragraph from the introduction:

"With the best will in the world, however, it is not an easy matter for a writer on Philosophy to avoid the charge of obscurity, not because of any professional leaning to the unintelligible---although it must in honesty be admitted that too many philosophers have mistaken obscurity of statement for profundity of thought---but because of the inherent difficulty of the subject-matter. Whatever deals with the fundamental and simple is bound to be difficult and complex, and it is no good ignoring the fact that philosophy, which is not to be lightly attempted by any, must always seem singularly like nonsense to some. I make no apology, then, for the difficulty of this book; it is at any rate easier than the philosophies it surveys."

This last claim is very modest, and is more than justified in the book. It is small praise of any book to say that it is easier than pragmatism or Bergsonianism; but it is no small praise to say, as can be said of this little book, that treating of pragmatism, without seeking to hide the inherent contradictions, it makes that method of philosophy as nearly intelligible as is possible to such a maze of inconsistencies. The author knows how to deal sympathetically with systems not his own, and to explain them lucidly even for the uninitiated.

"A History of Ethics" does not deserve the same praise as its companion volume. The English is perhaps as pure and as smooth, but it is sometimes not as clear, probably because the thought is not as clear. And the author shows in places a marked want of sympathetic understanding and therefore of objectivity of judgment. This is partly explained by the principle he lays down in his introduction, that "it is best to be personal where he cannot be authoritative". Authoritative he certainly is not, and it is a pity that his personal views are warped by downright prejudice,---prejudice which is the more disappointing because it is behind the times. The chapter on Socrates is excellent, because the author evidently has a sincere admiration for the grand old Athenian sage. But his views on the Middle Ages are unworthy of a cultured and presumably well-informed man of the twentieth century. Indeed, the impression is made that the author is not so much ill informed as ill-disposed towards the period of marvellous intellectual and ethical development during which Europe rose from barbarism to civilization under the influence of some of the keenest minds and greatest hearts that ever graced humanity. He says of it, "the sole merit of that period is that at the end of it slavery as the basis of society is extinct". Elsewhere he speaks of the same period in words that recall the rantings of the old-time pretended intellectuals, who knew nothing of the Middle Ages but what they had drawn from such sources as Mosheim and Hallam and Robertson.

The author also has the peculiar though common misconception that philosophy has little if anything objective to teach. "Philosophy", he says, "is, after all, essentially a wrangle.....In a sense the philosopher knows nothing; he deals with experiments, points of view, contingencies.....Nothing ~~is~~ indeed is so meaningless as the summary record of a philosopher's conclusions." To this we may say that it is reassuring to hear the author admit that his own conclusions are meaningless. Were they otherwise it would be sad for philosophy.

Pierre Bouscaren, S. J.

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P O S T S E R I P T

As we go to press, there comes to hand a copy of a mimeographed letter which is being sent out, apparently to all professors of philosophical and allied sciences, by Doctor Ryan of the Catholic University. This interesting communication was received by Father Austin Schmidt of St. Louis University. We reproduce it here without further comment, as evidence that our own ideas of a philosophical organization are shared by others:

May 21, 1925.

Dear Professor:

A number of teachers of philosophy and cognate subjects have expressed the wish that an American Catholic Philosophical Association be organized. There is no doubt that many thinkers outside the Church are very anxious to know and to understand our philosophical position. Again, a national organization would assist us greatly not only in making our own point of view known but also in acquainting us with one another and the work we are doing.

Could we count on your support of such an organization, should it be established? The view at the present time is that the initial organization meeting should be called for the first week in January, 1926.

I would be very pleased to learn your judgment on the planned organization and whether or not we could count on your joining with us in ~~xxx~~ an American Catholic Philosophical Association.

Yours very sincerely,

(signed) James H. Ryan.

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